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Abstract
Prior to 2005, New Orleans had struggled to retain its NFL franchise. The Saints
remained in the city, despite an outdated stadium and small media market, only through generous
direct public subsidies to the team. Paradoxically, the devastation wrought by Hurricane Katrina
in September 2005 actually improved the short-term viability of the franchise by spurring an
outpouring of local support for the team and by making relocation of the Saints politically
untenable for the league. The long-term outlook for the team, however, appears grim. Already a
small market, New Orleans’ population and business community has declined considerably due
to Katrina. The NFL’s G-3 loan program for stadium construction is tapped out. Finally, the
financial success of other NFL franchises has both raised the cost of fielding a competitive team
and increased the value of the Saints as a target of relocation.
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NFL Governance and the Fate of the New Orleans Saints: 
Some Observations 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
 The National Football League (NFL) Saints have experienced a remarkable 
resurgence in New Orleans following Hurricane Katrina, which devastated the City on 
August 29, 2005.  Tom Benson, the owner of the Saints, appeared determined to move 
the team to another city prior to the storm for financial reasons.  Attendance at Saints’ 
games had been decreasing, the Superdome was economically obsolete, funds in the 
NFL’s G-3 program were being rapidly depleted, and the financial condition of the City 
of New Orleans and the State of Louisiana placed the inducement payments to the Saints 
and National Basketball Association (NBA) Hornets in substantial jeopardy.  The Saints 
appeared headed west to either San Antonio, Texas or Los Angeles, California.  Katrina, 
in ways that could not have been easily anticipated, set in motion forces that at least 
stalled the much anticipated move westward.   
One purpose of this paper is to identify and analyze the factors responsible for at 
least delaying the Saints’ move to another city.  The NFL’s strong support for keeping the 
Saints in New Orleans immediately following the Hurricane represents one powerful 
reason why the Saints remained in the Crescent City.  Long term, however, the NFL 
position with regard to a host city for the Saints is less clear, and that ambiguous stance 
can be explained by League developments and initiatives as they relate to finances. The 
prospects for League financial support for New Orleans in their quest to retain the Saints 
appear dim as the NFL strives to develop a more comprehensive revenue sharing 
arrangement and the City struggles to rebuild.  The Saints on-field success for the 2006 
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season, the fact New Orleans is a small market, and the determination of the City to 
rebuild despite the odds, in a strange way, have conspired to diminish the prospects for 
additional NFL financial support through a program such as G-3 if past League practice 
is any guide. 
 The paper is organized as follows.  Part one identifies and offers an explanation 
for the NFL’s response to Katrina.  The second section of the paper discusses the NFL 
position regarding stadium construction to include a description of the G-3 program that 
was so vital to funding stadium construction following the elimination of tax-exempt 
bonds for stadiums after December 31, 1999.  Part three discusses developments relating 
to the G-3 program and the difficulties involved in reinstituting the program in part as a 
consequence of the $300 million contribution for the construction of a new stadium for 
the New York Giants and the New York Jets.  The fourth section of the paper compares 
the economy of New Orleans prior to and following the Hurricane.  Part five analyzes the 
various funding sources that can be tapped to keep the Saints in New Orleans. 
Conclusions and policy implications are discussed in the paper’s final section.  
 
 
The NFL Response to Hurricane Katrina 
 
 The NFL announced in December 2005, approximately four months after 
Hurricane Katrina made landfall on August 29, that the New Orleans Saints would 
remain in Louisiana for the 2006 season.  Games would be played at both a renovated 
Superdome and at Louisiana State University’s stadium in Baton Rouge.  The NFL 
announcement followed some contentious, if not confrontational, times between Saints 
owner Tom Benson and the citizens and fans of New Orleans and Louisiana as Benson 
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sought to move the team from New Orleans before and after Katrina.  According to a 
report issued days before the NFL announcement to keep the Saints in Louisiana for the 
2006 season, Benson had threatened to sue the NFL if it demanded that the Saints play 
their games in New Orleans in 2006 (Santora, 2005).     
Prior to Katrina Benson had reportedly rejected the state’s final offer to keep the 
Saints in New Orleans in late April of 2005.  The state’s offer included not only public 
financing of over 75 percent of a proposed $174 million Superdome renovation, but also 
direct cash payments to the Saints totaling $64 million through 2008 and $9.5 million per 
year after the completion of the renovations to the Superdome in 2008 (USA Today, 
2005). The state’s offer to the Saints, including the annual cash subsidy, would have 
placed the team in the top half of the financial standings in the NFL.  
The fact that Benson would reject such an offer, which included a direct cash 
subsidy to the team, speaks volumes about the financial realities of the NFL and the 
inordinate transfer of business risk from teams to their host cities.  While the state 
struggled to meet its contractual cash payments to the team in the wake of reduced tax 
revenues following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the only significant 
financial risk facing Tom Benson was the $81 million he would have been required to 
pay (representing the subsidies that the Saints have received since 2001), if he had broken 
his Superdome contract, which he could have done following the 2006 season 
(Konigsmark, 2005). That risk pales in comparison to the $1 billion written offer Benson 
claims to have received for the team in 2005, a 1,400 percent increase over the $70 
million price Benson paid for the Saints in 1985 (Robinson, 2005).  The lucrative offer 
Benson received for the team reflects at least in part the money-making potential of NFL 
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teams, which is explained in large part by the subsidies cities extend to attract a supply of 
teams that is limited by the NFL and its owners.  
Benson’s behavior provided an opportunity for the NFL to play the “good-cop” 
role, and Paul Tagliabue, the NFL Commissioner, seized the opportunity.  Roger 
Goodell, who replaced Tagliabue as Commissioner during the summer of 2006, described 
the NFL’s role in helping New Orleans and Louisiana recover in colorful football 
language. 
…the NFL threw a “Hail Mary pass” when it committed late last 
December to return to the storm-ravaged city, “and the people of this 
region caught it” (NFL.com, 2006). 
 
 Goodell has stated that the NFL contributed about $20 million to the 
reconstruction of the Superdome (NFL.com, 2006).  The NFL’s stance and financial 
contribution stood in stark contrast to Benson’s less sympathetic position to the City of 
New Orleans and its fans.  Had the NFL done and said nothing, they would have been at 
the very least guilty by association.  Tagliabue and the NFL received a significant amount 
of positive publicity, particularly on that autumn day in September when Monday Night 
Football returned to New Orleans.  The NFL did what any savvy marketing entity would 
have done, and the League deserves some credit for recognizing an opportunity and 
extending a helping hand to New Orleans and its citizens.   
Tagliabue’s efforts to keep the Saints in New Orleans enhanced his image and 
that of the NFL.  Regarding the Saints triumphant return to New Orleans on a Monday 
night in September 2006, Jeff Duncan observed: 
Tagliabue’s handling of the crisis will rank as one of the biggest 
accomplishments of his 17-year tenure as commissioner of the most 
powerful league in sports (Duncan, 2006).   
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 Tagliabue not only added luster to his legacy as Commissioner, but he, perhaps 
more impressively, salvaged at least some of Tom Benson’s tarnished image through 
giving much of the credit for keeping the Saints in New Orleans to him.  NFL vice 
president of communications Joe Browne made the following observation in explaining 
Benson’s designs to move the team.   
I think Tom was truly torn between his love for the city of New Orleans 
and also wanting to have a winning team last year.  He was being advised 
there was nowhere for the players to live in New Orleans, that the team’s 
training facility had been taken over by the National Guard.  He knew 
none of that was conductive to winning.  I think he was saying let’s get 
through this season as best we can and see where we go from there 
(Duncan, 2006).   
 
 Browne’s representation of Benson’s motives coupled with a remarkable change 
in Benson’s behavior as it related to Saints fans and an apparent tempering of his 
nomadic urges correlated with NFL financial support for Benson and the Saints.  It has 
been well publicized that the League provided $20 million to help repair the Superdome 
as previously noted.  What is less well known is the role the NFL played in securing local 
business support.  To wit: 
The League agreed to kick in $20 million toward the renovation of the 
Dome, targeting their dollars on several improvements that would enhance 
the Saints’ bottom line.  It hired former Saints and Miami Dolphins 
executive Eddie Jones to serve as a liaison between the NFL and the local 
business community and marketing executive Frank Vuono to market the 
team to national and international sponsors.  The NFL also helped 
organize the Saints Business Council, an affiliation of 27 local business 
leaders who pledged to support the Saints by buying suites, tickets and 
sponsorships (Duncan, 2006). 
 
 Rumors have circulated as well that the League passed the hat and owners 
provided $1 million each to help the Saints.  That rumored off-the-books $30 million may 
well have provided funds that enabled the signing of Drew Brees and Reggie Bush, two 
 6
players that contributed substantially to reversing Saints fortunes on the field.  NFL 
officials have not publicly acknowledged or commented on any monetary support for the 
Saints aside from $20 million.  Regardless of the amount of financial support, the NFL 
played a key role in keeping the Saints in New Orleans and calming the relationship 
between Benson and Saints fans and citizens of New Orleans and Louisiana.  Nationally, 
and in a public relations vein, the NFL’s behavior in New Orleans following Katrina 
contributed to its reputation as a community partner, an image that the League sought to 
advance through its G-3 program.  The next section of the paper is devoted to a 
discussion of the NFL’s G-3 resolution and stadium construction.    
 
NFL Stadium Construction and the NFL’s G-3 Program 
 Prior to December 31, 1999, funding for stadiums could be accomplished through 
the issuance of tax-exempt bonds.  Such an exemption transfers some of the stadium 
funding burden from taxpayers in a city that subsidizes stadium construction to federal 
taxpayers (Zimmerman, 1997).  The inequities in such an arrangement are obvious, and 
the federal government effectively eliminated tax exempt status for sports facilities 
projects at the end of 1999.  The NFL recognized that the costs of constructing facilities 
increased significantly as a consequence of increased debt service, and the League 
provided financing at what are arguably tax-exempt rates through their “G-3 program.”  
Prior to evaluating the implications of G-3, it is worth discussing the history and certain 
financial aspects of the NFL’s stadium loan plan.   
 The current value of NFL teams is inextricably linked to stadiums.  Information 
recorded in Table 1 below identifies franchise values and selected stadium information. 
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TABLE 1 
NFL Franchise Values, and  
Selected Stadium Information* 
 
Rank Team 
Franchise Value/Selected  
Statistics  
Year 
Stadium 
Opened 
Stadium 
Construction 
Cost 
$ Millions  
Operating 
Income 
$ Millions 
Revenue 
$ Millions 
Franchise 
Value 
$ Billions 
Percent of 
Value 
Attributable 
to Stadium 
1  
Washington Redskins 
1997 251 108.4 303 1.423 25 
2  
New England Patriots 
2002 397 43.6 250 1.2 21 
3 
Dallas Cowboys 
1971 35 37.1 235 1.2 17 
4 
Houston Texans 
2002 449 57.6 222 1 19 
5 
Philadelphia Eagles 
2003 512 54.2 218 1 18 
6 
Denver Broncos 
2001 401 26.9 207 .975 17 
7 
Cleveland Browns 
1999 300 47.1 206 .970 15 
8 
Tampa Bay Buccaneers 
1998 169 56.9 203 .955 17 
9 
Baltimore Ravens 
1998 220 27.8 201 .946 17 
10 
Chicago Bears 
2003 660 51.5 201 .945 14 
11 
Carolina Panthers 
1996 248 20.7 199 .936 16 
12 
Miami Dolphins 
1987 125 33.4 194 .912 16 
13 
Green Bay Packers 
2001 295 22.3 194 .911 13 
14 
Kansas City Chiefs 
1972 43 28.2 186 .894 15 
15 
New York Giants 
1976 78 26.9 182 .890 10 
16 
Seattle Seahawks 
2002 430 5.0 189 .888 15 
17 
Tennessee Titans 
1999 292 48.3 189 .886 15 
18 
Pittsburgh Steelers 
2001 281 25.5 187 .880 14 
19 
New York Jets 
1976 78 33.1 179 .876 10 
20 
St. Louis Rams 
1995 280 33.2 179 .841 11 
21 
Detroit Lions 
2002 500 16.1 178 .839 13 
22 
Indianapolis Colts 
1984 95 25.0 167 .837 9 
23 
Cincinnati Bengals 
2000 458 20.9 175 .825 12 
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24 
Arizona Cardinals 
2006 455 16.6 158 .789 7 
25 
Buffalo Bills 
1973 22 31.2 176 .756 13 
26 
Jacksonville Jaguars 
1995 145 22.5 173 .744 11 
27 
New Orleans Saints 
1975 134 -4.1 160 .738 7 
28 
Oakland Raiders 
1966 100 9.1 171 .736 11 
29 
San Francisco 49ers 
1971 25 11.8 171 .734 9 
30 
San Diego Chargers 
1967 27 24.8 170 .731 10 
31 
Atlanta Falcons 
1989 214 56.6 170 .730 9 
32 
Minnesota Vikings 
1982 55 16.3 167 .720 7 
Source:  Forbes, “NFL Team Valuations,” 
http://www.forbes.com/lists/2006/30/06nfl_NFL-Team-Valuations_land.html 
Site accessed on April 10, 2007 
* Information following the 2005 season 
 
 There are several things worth noting from the information recorded in Table 1. 
First, for the five franchises with the highest values, the stadiums account for between 17 
and 25 percent of their values.  The five franchises exhibiting the lowest values derive 
between 7 and 11 percent of their values from stadiums.  Excluding the Dallas Cowboys, 
of the five most valuable franchises, no stadium is older than 10 years.  The Dallas 
Cowboys stadium has undergone renovations under Jerry Jones’s guidance, which has 
allowed them to generate revenues from luxury seating and amenities that have enabled 
them to maintain rough financial parity with those teams with newer facilities.  Excluding 
the Atlanta Falcons, none of the five lowest valued franchises play in a stadium that is 
less than 25 years old.  If the Miami Dolphins Stadium, Pro Player Park, represents the 
financial watershed for modern sports stadiums, of the five lowest valued clubs, only the 
Falcons play in a stadium that is less than 20 years of age.  Simply put, the lowest valued 
clubs play in facilities that are generally old and economically obsolete.  
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 Second, revenues, as would be expected, correlate almost perfectly with the value 
of the franchise.  The thirteen highest valued teams exhibit a Spearman rank-order 
correlation coefficient of one between franchise value and revenue.  Stadiums account for 
much of the revenue differences since a significant portion of the luxury seating is not 
pooled, i.e. “local stadium revenues.”  Local stadium revenues are not divided 60-40 
percent between the home and visiting teams as are the revenues for the seats sold to the 
general public in the NFL.  Forbes does account for the nature of the stadium deals 
between host cities and teams as measured by stadium debt service expenses in 
establishing franchise value estimates.   
Third, it is significant that the biggest media markets do not necessarily 
correspond with the highest valued teams.  The New York Giants and Jets rank fifteenth 
and nineteenth, respectively, in franchise values, and that is due to the fact that both 
teams play in a facility that is more than thirty years old.  It has been estimated that the 
new $1.2 billion stadium the Giants and Jets are planning to build and share will increase 
annual revenues and profits for each club by $100 million and $22 million, respectively 
(Maske, 2006).  Another $100 million would put elevate the Giants and Jets to second 
and third place in the NFL revenue standings, and increase the value of the franchises to 
something in the neighborhood of 1.3 billion in 2006 dollars, an increase of 
approximately 45 percent. 
 Fourth, the New Orleans Saints play in the sixth oldest facility in the NFL.  The 
Saints financial performance was distinctive among NFL teams; they were the only team 
to show an operating loss in 2005.  The Saints, in fact, trailed the next worst financial 
performer by $13.2 million in the operating-income standings, and they were $112.5 
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million behind the operating-income leader, the Washington Redskins.  The median 
operating income performers, the New Giants and the Denver Broncos generated $31 
million more in profit than did the Saints.     
 Fifth, the information recorded in Table 1 clearly indicates that financial interests 
have motivated new stadium construction in the NFL.  Fifteen new stadiums (this 
includes the significant renovation of Green Bay’s Lambeau Field) have been built in the 
last decade.  Perhaps more telling is the fact that 20 stadiums have been constructed since 
Joe Robbie parlayed the up-front money he received from the sale and lease of luxury 
seating into the financing he needed to build what is now Pro Player Park.  Robbie 
redesigned the financial blueprint for stadium construction for all professional sports 
leagues in the United States. 
 Stadium construction would have occurred at a more modest pace absent tax-
exempt financing up until December 31, 1999 and G-3 loans thereafter.  The NFL’s G-3 
resolution, stipulated that the NFL would match up to $150 million of an owner’s private 
contribution for a new stadium.  The owner’s “contribution” did not involve the type of 
risk that we ordinarily associate with business capital investments.  Enhanced or 
altogether new revenue streams from the new facility often represented the owner’s 
private contribution.  A team, for example, could dedicate a portion of personal seat 
license revenue, stadium naming rights revenue, or luxury loge revenue to the stadium 
venture.  Had the new stadium not been built, these funds, of course, would not 
materialize.  The G-3 program was funded similarly with “new money.”  Josh Peter 
succinctly summarized how the loans were “repaid” in a recent article.  Peter observed: 
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The money used to repay the loan comes from the visiting team’s share of 
club-seat money at the new stadium.  If that proves insufficient, money 
will be taken from the leagues $18 billion TV contract (Peter, 2002).   
 
Income for owners and players were reduced as a consequence of the G-3 
resolution, but the owners and players willing agreed since they anticipated that their 
share of revenues from the new facility would more than compensate for the 34 percent 
of revenue they sacrificed to fund the new facility.  The older the stadium the more likely 
this would be true since the older facilities had less luxury seating and were otherwise 
less adaptable to modern stadium revenue generators.             
Summarizing, the timing of the NFL G-3 program appeared designed to replace 
stadium tax exempt financing.  The NFL turned down a $20 million loan request in 1995 
by Al Davis, owner of the then Los Angeles Raiders, to help in building a stadium to 
keep the team in Los Angeles.  Paul Tagliabue reportedly remarked in response to 
Davis’s request that, “We are a football league, not a bank” (Peter, 2002).  The NFL has 
been in the banking business since 1999, and individual teams, players, and owners have 
benefited.   
 
G-3 Developments and the Prospects for a New NFL Loan Program    
 The NFL exhausted its G-3 stadium funding through loans it made to help finance 
the construction of a new $1.2 billion stadium for the Giants and Jets, a $300 million 
loan, and a renovation of Arrowhead Stadium in Kansas City for the Chiefs, a $42.5 
million loan (Ratto and Gay).  The chances that the G-3 program will be replaced soon 
appear dim for several reasons.  First, new stadiums provide “local revenue” or revenue 
that is not shared, and the increased revenues drive up labor costs given that the current 
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Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) stipulates 67 percent of all revenues go to the 
players.  The importance of local revenues in determining overall revenues, operating 
income, and franchise values was previously discussed.  The disparity between revenues 
generated in large and small markets is beginning to resemble such well publicized 
disparities in Major League Baseball (MLB).  Mike Brown, the owner of the Cleveland 
Browns, was one of two owners that voted against providing a subsidy for the Giants and 
Jets facility.  Brown’s dissenting vote was explained in a recent newspaper article. 
Brown said the Bengals knew even when they went into Paul Brown 
Stadium in 2000 that their standing in league revenue would dip as the 
years went on.  But when the NFL decided all teams should contribute to 
subsidize stadiums being built in large markets like Dallas, Chicago, New 
York and Philadelphia with its G-3 program, the gap between small and 
big markets mushroomed quickly… 
 
The most subsidized teams in the league are the large-market teams that 
have received G-3 grants and have produced a cap cost push on to others 
(Hobson, 2007). 
 
 The increase in stadium generated revenues induces an increase in the salary cap, 
which in turn affects teams operating incomes disproportionately.  Teams such as the 
Cincinnati Bengals with $175 million in revenues and the salary cap set at $109 million 
for 2007 would exhaust 62 percent of their revenues on player salaries.  The same cap, 
however, would constitute only 36 percent of the $303 million in revenues garnered by 
the Washington Redskins for the 2005 season.   Small market clubs, despite the fact that 
the majority of them voted for G-3 funding for the Giants and Jets stadium, are likely to 
balk at any new G-3 type program without an agreement for a more comprehensive 
sharing of local stadium revenues.  New Orleans is among the small market clubs that 
would seek more equitable revenue sharing. 
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 The League, individual teams, and players have already demonstrated that they 
would be willing to fund stadiums through a G-3 type program only if the revenues 
generated by the new stadium were sufficient to compensate for revenues or income lost 
through giving up some revenue or income to fund the program.  The NFL has balked at 
making any long term commitment to New Orleans, and it might be based in part on a 
concern that revenues from a new stadium in New Orleans would not compensate owners 
and players for the revenues they sacrifice in a G-3 type program.  This perception, if it 
exists, is based on the condition of the New Orleans economy as well as the atypical 
performance on the field and financially of the Saints in 2006 and for 2007.  When asked 
if the NFL had any responsibility in rebuilding New Orleans Commissioner Goodell 
replied: 
Tom Benson, Paul Tagliabue and the NFL took a leadership position here 
about not turning their back on a community that needed us, and the NFL 
was there, and they brought the team back.  And they are playing there.  
They are operating there.  They have been there since January.  We are not 
talking about coming back.  We are back.  We did it at a time when we 
didn’t know whether we could get the dome completed.  We went to the 
state.  They determined that the rehabilitation of the dome was a critical 
component in the rebuilding of the community.  They believe that it was a 
huge economic driver and a huge symbolic effort to be able to get that 
dome reopened and be operating.  So we found a creative way to be able 
to get that done in the shortest possible timetable and contribute a 
significant amount of money, up to $20 million to get that done, and the 
25th will be a celebration of the collective effort to get that stadium 
completed, not just for the New Orleans Saints, but for the community and 
economic driving that will mean and all of the events that will combine 
that.  So the NFL is an important partner here and we wanted to play that 
role and I think we have very effectively, and we’re there and we’re 
operating… 
 
…I don’t have any crystal ball on what the community of New Orleans is 
going to be like going forward.  Obviously there are lots of questions, but 
we’re going to be there, continue to go try to do our part.  And we hope 
that the New Orleans community will come back even stronger than it was 
(NFLMedia.com, 2006). 
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 The future of a team in New Orleans may well hinge on whether the City will 
come back stronger than before, since that will be vital to support for the team.  The next 
section of the paper will compare the New Orleans economy pre- and post-Katrina to 
determine the prospects for New Orleans achieving the economic strength necessary to 
support the Saints.    
 
The Economy of New Orleans Pre- and Post-Katrina   
While New Orleans hosts major league franchises in both the NFL and NBA, with 
a pre-Hurricane metropolitan area population of less than 1.5 million residents, the city 
was already a small market for any of the major sports leagues in the U.S.   New Orleans 
was the 41st largest metropolitan area in the United States by population, and was the 36th 
largest city out of the 40 hosting a team from one of the five large professional sports 
leagues in the United States in 2004.  Five cities in the country without any major sports 
franchises, Las Vegas, Virginia Beach/Norfolk, Providence, Greensboro, and Austin, 
furthermore, are all larger than New Orleans.  Fourteen cities without an NFL franchise 
have larger population bases than New Orleans, including Los Angeles, the nation’s 2nd 
largest market, and football hungry San Antonio, which played host to the New Orleans 
Saints for three of their “home” games during the 2005 season. Not only is New Orleans 
small, but it is also relatively poor ranking 36th out of the 40 cities with major 
professional sports franchises.  
Another strike against New Orleans is its business climate, as corporations play a 
major role in keeping a team financially competitive.  It is one thing to provide highly 
profitable luxury seating; it is another to fill those seats. The city is home to just two 
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Fortune 500 companies: Entergy , ranked 218th and Freeport McMoRan Copper and 
Gold, ranked 480th, and there is, therefore, not the market for loges and club seats that 
can be found in the other NFL and NBA cities with which New Orleans competes 
(Corbett, 2006).  One writer somewhat whimsically stated the NFL financial equation in 
the following way: 
Instead of fans, the NFL seeks corporations...While the NBA and Major 
League Baseball have guaranteed contracts for their players, the NFL with 
its exorbitant TV rights deals and corporate backing has practically given 
their owners guaranteed dollars… 
 
The way business is done now is the owner convinces his buddies who 
own the largest businesses in their respective cities to buy majority (sic) of 
the season tickets and luxury boxes. The result: a term exclusive to the 
NFL, the guaranteed sellout. Saints owner Tom Benson can’t do that in 
New Orleans because there are no major corporations other than Entergy 
to back him (Terrebonne Parrish Courier, 2005). 
 
The competition to host a professional sports team is often as fierce as the 
competition among athletes on game day, and the lack of population base and both 
personal and corporate wealth placed New Orleans at a considerable disadvantage in 
supporting and, therefore, retaining the Saints prior to Hurricane Katrina.     
While recognizing New Orleans shortcomings as it relates to its ability to host 
professional sports, on the other side of the coin, the City caters to the tourist trade to an 
extent that distinguishes New Orleans from almost every other American city.  The 
infrastructure that New Orleans has created arguably provides a comparative advantage 
in hosting events to include commercial sports over most cities in the United States.  The 
City’s performance in attracting outside events supports the idea that it has exercised its 
comparative advantage.  Even though New Orleans is a relatively small city, it ranked 
fifth in the United States in the number of conventions hosted (Tennessean News 
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Services, 2005).  Prior to the storm New Orleans annually attracted more than 10 million 
visitors who spent in excess of $5 billion per year according to the New Orleans 
Metropolitan and Tourism Bureau.   
The information recorded in Table 2 below in a general sense indicates the extent 
to which New Orleans is geared to tourism.   
TABLE 2 
Aggregate Measures of the Fraction of the Economic Activity   
for Selected Cities and the United States Represented by the  
“Accommodation and Food Service Industry” (NAICS 72) for 2004 
 
Geographic 
Area/Statitic 
NAICS 72 
Employees as a % 
of Total Area 
Employees  
NAICS 72 
Annual Payroll as a 
% of Total Area 
Payroll 
NAICS 72 
Establishments as a 
% of Total Area 
Establishments 
United States 9.34 3.46 1.61 
New Orleans 13.46 5.83 9.47 
Atlanta 9.22 3.15 7.38 
Houston 9.05 2.83 7.35 
Miami 10.56 4.52 5.95 
Source:  http://censtats.census.gov/cgi-bin/msanaic/msasect.pl 
The fraction of the New Orleans economy that was accounted for by 
“Accommodation and Food Service” (NAICS 72) in 2004 indicated that New Orleans 
had a significantly larger tourist component than did the United States overall and three 
other southern cities in the U.S. that hosted NBA and NFL teams.  It is noteworthy that 
New Orleans tourist sector as measured by employees and payroll in NAICS 72 is more 
than 25 percent larger than that of Miami, Florida, which among the comparison group is 
generally regarded as the most tourist based.   
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Commercial sport, of course, is one important aspect of the tourist/leisure 
industry, and it could play a role in the economic revitalization of New Orleans.  Since 
opening in 1975, the Superdome has hosted numerous sporting events of national 
significance including the NFL’s Super Bowl in 1978, 1981, 1986, 1990, 1997, and 2002, 
the National Intercollegiate Athletic Association Men’s Basketball Final Four in 1982, 
1987, 1993, and 2003.  Furthermore, the Superdome annually hosts the Sugar Bowl, one 
of college football’s top post-season matches and a game which has determined college 
football’s national champion nine times since 1975. 
 Analyzing the tourism business for New Orleans is important because it bears on 
the capacity for continuing to offer inducement payments to retain the Saints.  
Inducement payments were generated from hotel and motel taxes to a significant degree.  
Paul Tagliabue opposed inducement payments at least in part because of the cyclical 
nature of tourism.     
 Data do exist for New Orleans for the number of establishments, annual payroll, 
and number of employees for a variety of entertainment related industries defined 
according to the North American Industrial Classification System (NAICS) and these 
data are recorded in Table 3 below.    
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TABLE 3 
Aggregate Measures of the Fraction of New Orleans Economic Activity in Total 
Represented by Spectator Sports for 1997a 
 
Ratio/NAICS 
Number 
NAICS 71: 
Arts, 
Entertainment, and 
Recreation (U.S.)b 
NAICS 711: 
Performing Arts, 
Spectator Sports, and 
Related Industries 
NAICS 7112: 
Spectator Sports
Industry 
Employees/New 
Orleans Total 
 
4.07% 
(1.61%) 
 
1.16% 
 
0.62% 
Annual Industry 
Payroll/New Orleans 
Total 
 
3.48% 
(1.19%) 
 
1.39% 
 
0.34% 
Industry 
Establishments/New 
Orleans Total 
 
1.74% 
(1.57%) 
 
0.94% 
 
0.20% 
Source: County Business Patterns. 
aSpecific data for New Orleans for two-digit NAICS 71 data and above for 1998 and 
beyond from the County Business Patterns website is not available.  Archived data for 
NAICS and SIC data were used to calculate the percentages in the table.  These 
percentages correspond to the higher end of the ranges identified in 
http://censtats.census.gov/cgi-bin/msanaic/msasect.pl   If an average of the value ranges 
identified were used, it would reduce the percentages and strengthen the arguments 
offered in the paper’s text.   
.bComparable Statistics for the United States are from the most recent County Business 
Patterns data for 2004.  Source:  http://censtats.census.gov/cgi-bin/msanaic/msasect.pl 
 
 All data point to the fact that the economic activity accounted for through the 
“Arts, Entertainment, and Recreation” industry (NAICS 71) for New Orleans is 
absolutely small, but large when compared to the United States overall.  Census data, 
thus, supports the idea that New Orleans exhibits an arts-entertainment-recreation 
industry that is larger than that characterizing the United States as a whole.   
The contribution of “Spectator Sports” (NAICS 7112), however, is less than 1 
percent by any of the measures identified in Table 3. Despite the high salaries paid 
professional athletes, the spectator sports industry typically accounts for less than 1 
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percent of a city’s payroll, and, by that measure, the industry is not economically vital to 
cities in the United States in general to include New Orleans.   
The absolute size of the entertainment and spectator sports industry might not 
adequately represent the impact the industry has on the local economy due to the fact the 
industries attract outside dollars and substitute for imports, thus retaining dollars that 
would leak from the economy in their absence.  An increase in net exports generates a 
stream of funds that can be used for inducement payments or to build sports 
infrastructure, all else equal.  Numerous studies of both professional sports franchises and 
stadiums as well as of mega-events, however, lend support to the notion that sports have 
little impact on local economies.  Analyses of the Super Bowl (Baade and Matheson, 
2006; Porter, 1999), NCAA Final Four (Baade and Matheson, 2004), and mega-events in 
general (Coates and Humphreys, 2002; Baade, Baumann, and Matheson, 2007), for 
example, have all concluded that these big sporting events have no statistically significant 
impact on any number of economic variables such as employment, per capita income, 
metropolitan area-wide gross domestic product, or taxable sales.  Most recently Coates 
and Depken (2006) indicated ambivalence about the economic contribution of sports 
mega-events.  Coates and Depken concluded:  “The upshot is, therefore, that these mega-
events are not necessarily the economic windfall that their proponents portray them to 
be.”  Stadiums and professional franchises (Baade and Dye, 1990; Coates and 
Humphreys, 1999; Baade, Baumann, and Matheson, 2007) similarly show little in the 
way of economic benefits for host cities. 
The New Orleans economy not only serves the nation as a tourist center but it is 
also a hub for water transportation, and any economic redevelopment effort should focus 
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on those industries.  This is an opinion endorsed by members of an ad hoc committee of 
urban experts assembled under the auspices of the Urban Land Institute.  The information 
in Table 4 below, to be specific, indicates that in July 2005, 32.9 percent of the labor 
force in New Orleans was employed in the “Trade and Transportation” and “Leisure and 
Hospitality” sectors.  Table 4, in general, provides statistics that enable a quick 
comparison of the New Orleans economy prior to and after Katrina.   
TABLE 4   
Comparing the Pre- and Post-Katrina Economies for the New Orleans MSA 
 
Statistic/Date July 2005 
 
July 2006 December 2006 
MSA Population 1,292,774 914,745a  
Unemployment Rate [Louisiana = 5.6%] New 
Orleans = 5.3% (United 
States = 4.9%) 
[Louisiana = 2.9%] New 
Orleans = 4.2% (United 
States = 4.8%) 
[Louisiana = 4.3%] New 
Orleans = 4.4% (United 
States = 4.5%) 
Labor Force Size 637,952 440,521 (Down 30.9% 
from July 2005) 
432,494 (Down 32.2% 
from July 2005) 
Population Employed in 
the Transportation and 
Trade Sector 
123,200 89,700 (Down 27.2% 
from July 2005) 
92,100 (Down 25.2% 
from July 2005) 
Population Employed in 
the Hospitality and 
Leisure Sector 
86,500 58,500 (Down 32.4% 
from July 2005) 
59,000(Down 31.8% 
from July 2005) 
Public Transportation:  
% of the System 
Operational 
100% 17% 17% 
Number of Workers 
Employed by 
Government  
103,000 or 16.3% of the 
labor force for 
government at all levels; 
15,600 for the federal 
government or 2.0% 
90,500 or 20.7% of the 
labor force for 
government at all levels; 
13,700 for the federal 
government or 3.1% 
91,300 or 20.4% of the 
labor force for 
government at all levels; 
12,100 for the federal 
government or 2.7% 
Number of Open Hotels 142 116 (Down 18% from 
July 2005) 
127 (Down 11% from 
Jul 2005) 
Open Retail Food 
Establishments 
100% 44% Not Available 
Number of Passengers 
Arriving at the New 
Orleans Airport 
441,356 281,015 (Down 36% 
from July 2005) 
286,018 (Down 35% 
from July 2005) 
Source:  Greater New Orleans Community Data Center, The Katrina Index, February 15, 
2007, www.gnocdc.org.  Accessed on March 3, 2007. 
aJanuary 2006 statistic.  Note the metropolitan population for New Orleans fell by 29.2 
percent from July 2005 to January 2006. 
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The numbers recorded in Table 4 indicate several things worthy of note.  First, the 
transportation/trade and leisure/hospitality industries, the cornerstones of the New 
Orleans economy, are recovering, albeit slowly.  The numbers employed in trade and 
leisure as of December 2006 remain down by 25.2 and 31.8 percent, respectively, but are 
up from the July 2006 employment figures by modest amounts.  
Second, the unemployment rate in New Orleans as of December 2006 is below 
that for the United States.  Prior to Katrina, the unemployment rate in New Orleans was 
above the rate for the country.  The smaller labor force in New Orleans following 
Katrina, of course, obscures developments with respect to the unemployment rate, but the 
workers who remained in or returned to New Orleans are able to find work.   
Third, all relevant statistics in Table 4 point to a contraction of the leisure industry 
following Hurricane Katrina.  There continues to be fewer people flying into New 
Orleans in comparison to pre-Katrina levels and a smaller number of establishments to 
accommodate them.  Nearly one year after Katrina, the number of retail food 
establishments was 44 percent of the level prior to the storm, and the number of hotels 
open remains below the pre-Katrina level.   
Fourth, the government sector has expanded relative to the private sector, and the 
federal government’s presence, while absolutely and relatively small, is approximately 
one-third larger as measured in terms of the percentage-of-labor-force employed by the 
federal government in December 2006 than it was pre-Katrina. 
It cannot be predicted at this juncture if and when New Orleans will return to 
those population and economic-activity levels that existed prior to the storm.  There is 
compelling scholarship by Davis and Weinstein (2002) to suggest that population and 
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economic activity across cities and regions within a country are not random occurrences, 
but rather reflect “locational fundamentals,” e.g., location on a coast or significant river 
(physical geography), and economies of scale emanating from “economic clustering.”  
The Davis and Weinstein study is based on 8,000 years of data on Japanese regions, and 
Japan’s population is far more homogenous than that characterizing the United States.  
The population of New Orleans is particularly diverse.   
Other scholarship supports the importance of locational fundamentals in 
explaining developments relating to population movements following catastrophic 
events.  Evidence following the Chicago Fire of 1871, indicates that the City’s recovery 
from that event depended on location fundamentals specific to neighborhoods (Macaulay, 
2005).  More recently, economic recovery from the 1992 Rodney King riots in Los 
Angeles was notably slow as compared to Miami’s experience following the devastation 
of Hurricane Andrew in the same year (Baade and Matheson, 2004; Baade, Baumann, 
and Matheson, 2007). Taken together, these findings suggest that heterogeneity as it 
relates in part to ethnicity, shared values and culture, income and wealth, and education 
can retard redevelopment and efforts to resettle.  Many New Orleans neighborhoods, 
where redevelopment has been slow to occur, exhibit marked variation in these 
characteristics and relatively low rates of home ownership as previously mentioned.  
The extent of the devastation caused by Katrina coupled with the demographic 
character of New Orleans prior to the storm bears on the prospects that residents of the 
City will resettle.  The likelihood that New Orleans will return to its pre-Katrina state, in 
turn, will affect the probability that professional sports teams will remain in the City.  If 
the chances increase that pro-sport teams will eventually leave due to a lack of fan 
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support that has implications for the efficacy of substantial public investments to replace 
or repair the professional sports infrastructure.   
Paradoxically, the extent of the devastation and the significant pressure exerted on 
the public sector to demonstrate its resolve and ability to help the City recover enhances 
the prospects that those edifices most representative of the City to the outside world will 
be restored.  Delaney and Eckstein (2003) identified the strength of “local growth 
coalitions” as vital to understanding public choices regarding the construction of sports 
infrastructure.  The public choice theory detailed by Delaney and Eckstein helps explain 
decision making in New Orleans with regard to the rapid reconstruction of the 
Superdome, and the successful floating of the $294-million bond issue that financed the 
repair.  Not only was there a strong local growth coalition following Katrina, but that 
local effort was bolstered by a strong national sentiment for helping New Orleans get 
back on its feet.  Ironically, the ineptitude that government displayed arguably at all 
levels immediately following the storm increased the pressure on government to correct 
the negative perceptions about its performance.  Louisiana Governor Kathleen Babineaux 
Blanco in announcing the bond sale remarked that, “Rebuilding and reopening the 
Superdome were critical steps in Louisiana’s recovery from hurricanes Katrina and Rita 
and this bond sale made them possible.” (New Orleans City Business, 2006)  The 
Superdome as a symbol of the City’s ability to survive and its struggle to recover 
achieved particular significance as Katrina’s impact played out.   
The demand for the Saints, the primary tenant of the Superdome, has been given a 
boost by the increase in the political demand for the Superdome.  The political resistance 
for public subsidies to keep the Saints from marching elsewhere has eased, and the 
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successful sale of the bonds to repair and renovate the Superdome corroborates that 
assertion.  All in all, in a peculiar way, financial transfers to Tom Benson have been 
made easier as a consequence of the storm. 
 Once again the efficacy of those transfers depends on the prospects for 
redevelopment in New Orleans and that depends on the City’s ability to restore its place 
as a leading transportation and leisure center.  Much of the tourism industry in New 
Orleans is “high-ground” based in the French Quarter, the Central Business District 
(CBD), and the Garden District.  The Urban Land Institute committee, which met on 
November 18, 2005 opined: 
New Orleans should concentrate its rebuilding efforts on the sections of 
the city that occupy the high ground, while securing lower-lying areas for 
potential long-term rebirth…it’s not practical to redevelop every acre of 
New Orleans in the short term, considering that 300,000 residents and 
160,000 jobs have been lost.  It’s also not socially equitable to allow 
residents back into neighborhoods that do not have adequate levee 
protection and may be toxic… (Carr, 2005). 
 
The report of the Bring Back New Orleans Commission recommended that all of 
New Orleans not necessarily be rebuilt. If that recommendation is followed, the post-
Katrina New Orleans will be smaller than the it was before the storm, and that has 
implications for the ability (or willingness) of sports to serve as a catalyst for economic 
redevelopment. Even if the metropolitan area shrinks by as few as 250,000 residents, still 
suggesting that over 80% of the population would return to the area, New Orleans would 
become the second smallest “major-league” city in the country behind only Green Bay, 
Wisconsin, and would be smaller than such distinctly “non-major league” cities such as 
Albany, Richmond, Birmingham, and Grand Rapids, Michigan. 
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Tourists will not likely return to a city that cannot provide essential services, and 
in the absence of tourists, the New Orleans economy will struggle at least for a time. One 
part of the blueprint for restoration of the New Orleans economy will require restoration 
of housing and essential services for its middle class who provide the labor and 
entrepreneurial talent for the tourism industry, followed by a revitalization of those 
businesses that cater to tourists.  Despite the slow recovery and the evidence to suggest 
that New Orleans will be smaller following Katrina than before, the likelihood that the 
Saints will remain in the City ultimately depends on the financial support and prospects 
for the team.  The next section of the paper analyzes that issue  
 
Financial Prospects for the Saints 
The Saints’ future in New Orleans by virtually all accounts was tenuous prior to 
Katrina as previously discussed.  Following the storm, theoretically, the ability of the 
community to support the team has eroded, and logic would argue that if the City had 
difficulty supporting the team prior to the storm, this support seemed destined to diminish 
following Katrina.  Ben Hales, the vice president of marketing for the team summarized 
the Saints plight in a recent newspaper article.  Hales commented:  “We’re nowhere 
where we need to be, given the state of the community.  The problems that we had before 
Katrina have been exacerbated” (Sandomir, 2007).   
The Saints currently depend on three sources for income:  fans and other private 
interests, government through inducement payments, and the League.  The status of 
financial support from each of these groups will be analyzed in turn in the remainder of 
this section.   
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Despite tepid support prior to Katrina, fans and businesses have rallied behind the 
Saints, and their financial support has helped forge an agreement between state officials 
and the team to keep them in New Orleans through the 2010 season.  Saints owner Tom 
Benson would not commit to anything beyond 2010, and both Benson and the League are 
likely trying to determine if the current financial support can be sustained beyond 2010 
before committing to the City beyond that year (Duncan, 2007). 
The concern may be that the current support stems from the Saints rousing 
success during the 2006 season, which ended in a loss in the NFC championship game in 
Chicago on January 21, 2007, coupled with a determined effort to demonstrate that the 
City of New Orleans remains vital and will rebuild following Katrina.  State officials 
announced in mid-March of 2007 that not only had Saints fans purchased all the tickets 
available for the upcoming season, a repeat of their first-ever such performance in 2006, 
but all available Superdome suites were purchased as well.  Additionally, it has been 
reported by The Times-Picayune that there is a season ticket wait list of 25,000 people 
(saintsdoggle, 2007).  This substantial vote of private dollars to retain the Saints 
apparently has involved not only fans in New Orleans but fans/citizens of Louisiana and 
Gulf Coast.  There are increasing references to the Saints being Louisiana’s and the Gulf 
Coast’s team both by the NFL and to state officials.  To wit: 
At the same time, many of the suburban areas west and north of New 
Orleans, which were much better off economically even before Katrina, 
were spared the worst flooding and have recovered quickly or are even 
booming from the displacement of many residents to those areas. 
 
The metro area population is around 1.2 million now, and the Saints have 
been marketing with success within a three-hour driving radius from the 
Superdome, which includes midsize cities such as Baton Rouge and 
Lafayette in Louisiana, Jackson, Miss. and Mobile, Ala. (NFL.com, 2006).      
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It is important to note that the record Saints ticket sales in 2006 and 2007 were 
induced, at least in part, through discounting.  The price of 20,000 seats were reduced to 
less than $35 with a number of those going for the very un-NFL-like price of only $14 
(Isidore, 2006).  The fact that the Saints averaged only 42,897 fans for their three games 
in Baton Rouge supports the hypothesis that the combination of recent Saints’ success, 
more focused and effective marketing efforts, and reduced ticket prices is responsible for 
the surge in attendance in 2006 and 2007 (Sportstraveler, 2005).    
Government support beyond the 2010 season is questionable.  It is not rational for 
government to continue to subsidize a business that is not committed long term 
particularly in light of the demand on scarce government funds.  Despite the recent 
success with private support, long-term promises from the team and the League to stay in 
New Orleans have proved elusive.  The Saints have come to depend on subsidies from 
Louisiana.  The risk involved in continuing to invest in the Saints coupled with depleted 
government coffers, has jeopardizes the inducement payments and the construction of a 
new stadium in the longer term.  A March 2007 Bureau of Government Research (BGR) 
Report concluded: 
New Orleans has certainly seen better financial days.  The property tax 
base is down 15% from its pre-Katrina level.  Revenues from total taxes 
and other locally generated sources are down 28%.  The City’s 2007 
budget is heavily dependent on federal and state grants and is “balanced” 
by borrowings.  At the same time, the needs remain great.  Restoring and 
improving the infrastructure, already in deteriorated condition before the 
levee breaks will require substantial local investment. 
 
Against this backdrop, the Industrial Development Board of the City of 
New Orleans, Louisiana (IBD), an economic development entity created 
decades ago by the City Council, is receiving requests from developers for 
significant tax breaks (Bureau of Government Research, 2007).         
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 New Orleans and the State of Louisiana has what amounts to a “scissors crisis” 
that is to say state and local budgetary health has been adversely affected by both reduced 
revenues and escalating costs and demands.  It may well be that Katrina will force the 
State and the City to admit that they cannot afford the Saints at the price defined by past 
agreements.  Louisiana bought time through the 2010 season by agreeing to provide 
$70.5 million dollars in inducement payments through that year.  Had the State elected to 
forego those payments, the Saints would have had the option to terminate their lease and 
relocate.  The State is gambling that the economy will recover enough to afford the 
Saints, and that high-stakes wager could be undermined by anyone of a number of 
adverse global, national, regional, or local economic developments to include another 
catastrophic storm.   
 The risk state and local government has assumed in financing the renovation of 
the Superdome is at least in part psychologically motivated.  The Superdome was a 
symbol around which residents of New Orleans rallied to demonstrate their resolve to 
rebuild their community.  Gary Roberts, a sports law professor had Tulane observed: 
One could make the argument that the city will never be able to keep a 
viable major sports franchise and it’s throwing money down a rat hole to 
try to keep something…it makes sense both economically and 
psychologically – to repair the Superdome even if the Saints decide to 
leave New Orleans (Isidore, 2006).   
 
 The federal government, and taxpayers at the national level, has contributed to 
keeping the Saints in New Orleans.  FEMA reportedly contributed $116 million to the 
first phase of Superdome repairs (Isidore, 2006).  It is unlikely that the federal 
government will be able to provide additional financial assistance to the Saints in light of 
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the trend in legislation away from unjustified national funding of local sports facilities 
projects.  
Meanwhile the NFL has given every indication that it has financially subsidized 
the Saints as much as it can.  G-3 stadium funding has been exhausted, and a replacement 
program is unlikely to be implemented without salary cap reforms, which must be 
approved by a super majority vote of team owners.  Roger Goodell has expressed concern 
about the stadium funding situation, but he has made clear that other problems must be 
addressed before the stadium funding issue.  Rotto and Gay articulated Goodell’s position 
as follows: 
Goodell said he is, naturally, concerned about the stadium situation on the 
West Bay (he didn’t mention any concerns about the Raiders’ under-
attended stadium in the East Bay), and he has kept abreast of the situation.  
But, he said the league needs to address a lot of problems, and he didn’t 
indicate many solutions – and this stadium-funding problem clearly is one 
for which he doesn’t have a solution right now.  In fact, Goodell said it 
wouldn’t be back on the table until the intra-ownership flight over revenue 
sharing and the ongoing/eternal labor situation are resolved, which is code 
for “You fellas are on your own” (Ratto and Gay, 2007). 
           
 The lack of a G-3 type program does help New Orleans in one way.  Los Angeles, 
along with San Antonio the most often mentioned potential new host cities for the New 
Orleans franchise, is on its own in funding a new stadium as well.  Los Angeles has 
displayed no particular enthusiasm for generating stadium funds on its own in the past. 
A recent statement by Joe Browne, an NFL executive vice president makes the 
League’s position on additional financial support for New Orleans quite clear.  Browne, 
quoted directly said: 
We want the Saints to succeed in New Orleans, but the business 
community, especially, has to step up and continue to support them.  We 
already have the best revenue-sharing plans in sports, and that helps teams 
like New Orleans in a small market (UltimateJaguars Newsroom, 2007).  
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 An amended NFL labor agreement, one that recognizes the cost-push pressure on 
small market clubs such as the Saints, could help alleviate some of the pressure without 
providing any additional direct financial support.  As previously noted, the salary cap for 
the 2007 season is $109 million, and it is expected to rise 27.5 percent to about $139 in 
2008.  Absent matching revenue increases the Saints financial position will deteriorate 
further and make relocation more likely after the 2010 season.   
 Ben Hales, the Saints vice president of marketing, clearly left the door wide open 
for a Saints relocation as did former Commissioner Tagliabue who in response to a 
question about a new location said “It’s still an open question,” while citing the local 
economy as pivotal to New Orleans retaining the team (Isidore, 2006).  Hales said:  “It’s 
a challenge.  We’re not any different from any other business in the region.  There’s (sic) 
lots of unknowns” (Isidore, 2006). 
 The Saints, of course, could help ameliorate some of the financial pressures by 
tempering their demands, and exhibiting what amounts to profit-satisficing rather than 
profit-maximizing behavior.  Sandomir wrote that “…some sports marketing experts said 
it was unlikely the Saints would ever earn enough in New Orleans to satisfy the Benson 
family, which could earn much more by playing in a larger, more stable and wealthier 
market” (Sandomir, 2007). 
 Commenting on the Saints financial viability short and long term, Dennis 
Lauscha, the team’s chief officer observed: 
We’re financially viable.  We have two big problems, a facility problem 
and a market problem.  If you fix both, you’ll have strong viability 
(Sandomir, 2007). 
 
 31
One does not have to be a cynic to suggest that Lauscha appears to be suggesting 
that a new stadium and a restoration of the economy are essential to keeping the Saints in 
New Orleans.  Given the City’s slow recovery and the lack of funds to support the 
construction of a new stadium, the price to keep the Saints may well be beyond the grasp 
of New Orleans without some NFL or some other divine intervention. 
  
Conclusions and Policy Implications 
This purpose of this paper was to analyze the prospects for the Saints staying in 
New Orleans.  Financial motives accounted for the nomadic urges expressed by Saints 
owner Tom Benson prior to Hurricane Katrina, and there is no reason to expect that 
Benson in any long-term sense will not seek to maximize the return on his Saints’ 
investment.  Katrina, however, in unexpected ways, extended the life of the New Orleans 
Saints through the 2010 season through galvanizing fan and other private support, some 
of which involved national sponsorships, for the team.  Perhaps more important the storm 
induced a sympathetic response from the NFL and its owners, which translated into real 
financial support.  Retention of the Saints beyond the 2010 season, after the empathetic 
reaction to Katrina dissipates, will require financial developments that are more typical of 
standard NFL practices.  New Orleans will need a new stadium to retain its NFL 
franchise in all probability.  That will not happen without public money and NFL loans 
through a G-3 type program.  The public money will be available only if New Orleans 
recovers fully from Katrina.  NFL stadium loans will materialize only if a growing divide 
between small and large market teams emanating from significant differences in local 
stadium revenues can be resolved.  Given the lack of developments on both fronts, it 
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would have been a safer to bet on the Saints appearance in the NFC championship game 
prior to the 2006 season than to wager that the Saints will stay in New Orleans beyond 
the 2010 season.     
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